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I. INTRODUCTION
"'Young minority males in particular are strongly motivated to
avoid [the police]' and 'strive to avoid running into the police, believing
that such encounters are all too often the prelude to abuse.' "2 This atti-
tude is likely the result of a "group recognition that the majority society
has unfairly used indicators beyond community control, like race as a
cue, to identify certain behavior patterns within the community."
This group recognition makes both police and judicial interpreta-
tions of unprovoked flight extremely problematic. United States
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens himself wondered what the
term "unprovoked" meant in Illinois v. Wardlow.4 Years of police vio-
lence, he reasoned, would "provoke" any individual to avoid such con-
tact. Like-minded opponents of Wardlow agree:
Where a group of people is subjected to harassment, brutality,
and systematic injustice to the point where faith is lost in the people
hired to protect them, what amount of narrow arrogance is required to
state that a black man, who flees from a white officer, did so unpro-
voked? The police forces around the country that have practiced
biased policing provoke the subjects of their profile to flee their arbi-
trary and injurious pursuits. The flight of Sam Wardlow was not
unprovoked. Instead, it was a justifiable response to an unjust
system.'
The avoidance of potentially life-changing authority like the police is
perhaps more deeply cultural and sociological than the United States
Supreme Court will judicially recognize.
In a 2000 study, researchers Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt
concluded that minority flight is a "poor indicator that crime is afoot."6
This conclusion is based on examining data from New York City street
stops where Meares and Harcourt found an average of nine stops for
every one eventual arrest. This number was twice as high for blacks in
New York.' More recent 2010 data shows more of the same, that out of
2. C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. II), 24 So. 3d 1181, 1191 (Fla. 2009) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(quoting MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD W. SMIrH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS OF AN
URBAN DILEMMA 94 (2008)).
3. David Seawell, Wardlow's Case: A Call to Broaden the Perspective of American
Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REv. 1119, 1130-31 (2001).
4. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 141 n.5 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Nowhere in Illinois' briefs does it specify what it means by 'unprovoked.'")
(5-4 decision).
5. Seawell, supra note 3, at 1135 (citations omitted).
6. Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science
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137,301 stop and frisks in New York City, 56% of those stopped were
black, 31% Hispanic, and only 10% white, while 100,000 (72.8%) of
these stops did not lead to an arrest.8
The consequences of the criminalization of flight are not solely the
conjectural aggravation of police-citizen relations discussed in the form
of statistics. Consequences also involve increased violence between
officers and those they pursue. Lawmakers should be concerned for
those disenfranchised individuals in impoverished, high-crime neighbor-
hoods who do not have the economic or political resources to pursue
remedies. This would especially involve illegal noncitizens throughout
Florida. The Miami New Times covered a story on Border Patrol abuses
including the following excerpt involving noncitizen flight:
Of the deportees he encounters, Diaz Romero [of No More
Deaths migrant-aid station] says, "Many people who arrive here have
been beaten, have gone days without food.
"Oh, and if they [have] run, that only made the agents angry.
The [agents] beat them to punish them."
Deportee Armando told volunteers that an agent beat him for
fleeing. It happened after he had grown too tired to go on. He
stopped, turned toward the agent, and threw his hands up in the air.
The officer caught up, yanked Armando's head back, and slammed
his fist into the side of the immigrant's face.9
Though Border Patrol officers are only given authority to conduct war-
rantless felony arrests,'o the excerpt serves as an example of how flight
may lead to violence and abuse. Under Florida law, a police officer may
arrest without a warrant when there is a misdemeanor being committed
in his presence, such as resisting arrest without violence, and may use
such force as is necessary to effect the arrest." The officer, for the most
part, is his own judge as to the degree of the force to be used.12
On the other hand, studies involving data from Florida jurisdictions
show the correlation between race and arrests may be more illusory than
real.'" A study aimed at revealing how officers form suspicion and make
8. Sean Gardiner, NYPD Releases Stop-and-Frisk Data, METROPOLIS, THE WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/1 1/10/nypd-releases-stop-and-frisk-datal.
9. Monica Alonzo, Culture of Cruelty: Feds Bury Border Patrol Abuses of Immigrants,
MiAi NEW TiMEs, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2010-12-16/news/culture-of-
cruelty-feds-bury-border-patrol-abuses-of-immigrants/, at 4-5.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006).
11. Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1959), cert. denied, 115
So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1959).
12. Id.
13. Meghan Stroshine et al., The Influence of "Working Rules" on Police Suspicion and
Discretionary Decision Making, 11 POLICE Q. 315, 318 (2008) (study involving data from forty-
nine Miami-Dade county police officers, stating "that officers are more likely to form suspicion on
minority group members than Whites, but that they are no more likely to take action against them
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decisions (rather than subsequent conduct) concluded that "the serious-
ness of the alleged offense, and the strength of evidence as perceived by
the officer, are the most important factors associated with a police
officer's actions." 4 This stands in contrast to what Alpert, MacDonald,
and Dunham call the "less important factors" of race, social class, and
demeanor of the suspect.15
Is the so-called "group recognition""6 one of inaccuracy? Studies in
urban areas do show that minorities are much more prone to police har-
assment;" therefore, assuming that unprovoked flight from police is
indicative of criminal activity is problematic.
Whether perception, reality, or both, the recent police shooting
death of an unarmed black man during an Overtown traffic stop in
Miami continue to breed fear of police in high-crime, low-income
areas.' 8 "Very seldom do we have these kinds of incidents occurring
with African-American officers in African-American communities,"
Miami Commissioner Richard Dunn stated in response to the incident.19
"Not to say they are racist," he added, "but many times people come in
our areas, and they don't understand us."2 0
This paper discusses the legal basis for the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. II), which criminalized the act of
"continued flight" from law enforcement. 2 1 The case is controversial in
light of the community-police tensions discussed above. This paper
than against White citizens") (citing Geoffery P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary
Decisionmaking During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407 (2005)).
14. Geoffery P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decisionmaking During
Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 410 (2005).
15. Id.
16. Seawell, supra note 3, at 1130-31 (2001) (stating there is a "group recognition that the
majority society has unfairly used indicators beyond community control, like race, to identify
behavior patterns within the community").
17. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
18. After a prosecutorial investigation, the officer was deemed justified when victim,
DeCarlos Moore was thought to be reaching inside his car for a gun. David Ovalle & Charles
Rabin, Miami Officer Cleared in Fatal Shooting of Unarmed Motorist in Overtown, MIAMI
HERALD, May 5, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/05/2202930/officer-cleared-in-fatal
shooting.html#ixzzlNwg8TPxc (also stating that only two of seven men killed in recent police
shootings were actually armed).
19. Kelly House, Hundreds Mourn Shooting Victim; Leaders Urge Calm, MIAMI HERALD,
July 17, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/0717/1735643/hundreds-mourn-shooting-
victim.html#ixzz0utxLPUA8.
20. Id. (emphasis added); see also Charles Rabin & David Ovelle, Police Shooting in Little
Haiti Leaves I Dead, 1 Injured, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/
2011/02/11/2061599/police-involved-shooting-leaves.html#ixzzlNweTHHzI (community leaders
ask for federal investigation of Miami-Dade Police Department).
21. C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. 11), 24 So. 3d 1181, 1181 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied,
130 S.Ct. 3290 (2010).
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argues the Florida legislature should take steps to protect certain individ-
uals who may unwittingly find themselves caught in the broad net of this
crime.22
Part II of this paper discusses the statute at issue, found in section
843.02 of the Florida Statues. This note also discusses basic Fourth
Amendment principles, including consensual encounters, the investiga-
tory stop, and probable cause for a lawful arrest. In Part II-A, this paper
analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court precedent Terry v. Ohio2 3 and Illinois
v. Wardlow, 24 interpreting the reasonableness of warrantless seizures
and pat-downs under the Fourth Amendment. Part 1I-B discusses the
conflicting case law in the Florida District Courts of Appeal leading to
the decision in C.E.L. II, including an in-depth analysis of the lower
court C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. I) decision, much of which the Florida
Supreme Court adopts.
Part III-A analyzes the C.E.L. II decision itself, as its reasoning is
constrained by the Florida Constitution. In Part III-B, this paper focuses
on Justice Pariente's concurrence, which highlights surviving defenses
in the criminal attorney's arsenal. These include (1) disputing the exis-
tence of reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop,
(2) arguing the defendant's flight was not "unprovoked" or "headlong,"
and (3) disputing the site of arrest as a "high-crime area." Part III-C
briefly mentions suppression cases decided after C.E.L. II and considers
where this area of the law may be heading.
Part IV concludes this note by offering political solutions to the
problems presented by the current state of the law, both legislative and
executive. This paper recommends adding additional language to section
843.02 in an approach borrowed from the "community caretaking"
model. Here, this paper proposes that as a condition to a warrantless
arrest under the statute, the officer must have reasonable grounds to
believe that some emergency exists. This proposal brings the statute in
line with the initial bases for allowing such stops from Terry v. Ohio and
Illinois v. Wardlow. Also, this solution addresses the concerns of the
lower district courts of appeal giving rise to the legal conflict.
22. For public reaction, see A Troubling Legal Double Standard, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/a-troubling-legal-double-standard/l0
59899 (stating that decision "greatly shifts the balance of power . . . inviting potential abuse by
rogue officers"). But cf The Troubling Pro-Criminal Legal Standard of the St. Petersburg Times,
RES PUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2009, 3:21 AM), http://respublicamyblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/21/the-
troubling-pro-criminal-legal-standard-of-the-st-petersburg-times/ (conservative response to St.
Petersburg Time article).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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1I. BACKGROUND
Not long ago, the Florida Supreme Court aggravated police-com-
munity tensions that exist in high-crime, low-income areas of Florida.
The court in C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. 11)25 found that a juvenile's contin-
ued act of running from the police after being instructed to stop was a
criminal act.26 Prior to C.E.L. II, an officer patrolling a high-crime
neighborhood had no right to stop an individual who merely ran away
after recognizing the officer's presence. Now in that same situation, the
officer may order the individual to stop, pursue them, 27 arrest them,28
and search that individual incident to a lawful arrest. 29 Essentially, the
analysis skips the "stop and inquire" investigatory portion of the police-
citizen encounter3 0 and immediately matures the individual's actions
into probable cause for an arrest. Many judges, scholars, and practition-
ers already recognize the problems with interpreting the act of flight.
These problems are compounded in light of the initial basis for the "rea-
sonable articulable suspicion" standard3 ' and the practical consequences
of such an interpretation.3
The statute at issue in C.E.L. II, titled "Resisting [an] officer with-
out violence to his or her person," specifically criminalizes "resist[ing],
obstruct[ing], or oppos[ing] any officer . .. in the lawful execution of
any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the
officer."33 This crime is found in Florida statute section 843.02 within
the broad chapter of criminal statutes entitled "Obstructing Justice."
Those found guilty of doing so are guilty of a first-degree misde-
meanor, 3 4 and may be sentenced up to a year in prison3 5 or given a
$1,000 fine,36 not including court costs.
This seemingly minor crime has major consequences, including the
immediate effect of providing a precipitous doctrinal obstacle for
defense attorneys to suppress evidence involving much more serious
25. C.E.L. II, 24 So. 3d at 1181.
26. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (2011).
28. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (2011) ("A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a
warrant when ... the person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or
county ordinance in the presence of the officer. An arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or
the violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made immediately or in fresh pursuit.").
29. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that searches incident to lawful arrests
are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment).
30. As enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. See id.
32. See supra Part I.
33. FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (2011).
34. Id.
35. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (2011).
36. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(l)(c) (2011).
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crimes. There are also more unforeseen long-term social justice implica-
tions involving police-citizen relations, involving juvenile recidivism
and the imposition of a criminal history that could interfere with career
and educational opportunities for young offenders.
In order for a police officer to lawfully stop an individual under the
Fourth Amendment, he or she must have an articulable reasonable suspi-
cion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime."
A Florida law enforcement officer may, of course, conduct a "field inter-
view," which is a consensual encounter.3 1 "[T]he hallmark of a consen-
sual encounter is the citizen's right to either voluntarily comply with the
officers' requests or terminate the encounter at any time."39 Many indi-
viduals, especially adolescents, will choose to exercise this right by run-
ning away.4
As background, there are three levels of police-citizen encounters.
An oft-cited Florida Supreme Court passage reads as follows:
There are essentially three levels of police-citizen encounters.
The first level is considered a consensual encounter and involves
only minimal police contact. During a consensual encounter a citizen
may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or
choose to ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave during a
consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked.
The second level of police-citizen encounters involves an inves-
tigatory stop as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio. At this level, a police
officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a crime. In order not to violate a citizen's Fourth
Amendment rights, an investigatory stop requires a well-founded,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion is not
enough to support 'a stop.
[T]he third level of police-citizen encounters involves an arrest
which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or
37. See id. (distinguishing an investigatory stop, requiring a reasonable articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot, from an arrest, requiring the facts known to the arresting officer
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed); see also FLA. STAT. § 901.151(2) (2011)
(known as the Florida Stop and Frisk Law, allows investigatory detentions and pat-downs of
suspicious individuals "under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this
state . . . .").
38. Yarusso v. State, 942 So. 2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2006) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 31-33 (1968)).
39. Id. at 942.
40. C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. II), 24 So. 3d 1181, 1191 (Pariente, J., concurring) (quoting
MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD W. SMrrm, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS OF AN URBAN
DILEMMA 94 (2008)).
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is being committed.4 1
The problem with Florida Statute section 843.02 is that "[i]n the span of
a few seconds and perhaps seventy-five feet," individuals are "trans-
formed from free persons protected by the Fourth Amendment into mis-
demeanants subject to arrest." 4 2
Until C.E.L. II, a defendant's flight at the sight of a police officer
did not amount to resisting an officer in the lawful execution of his
duties.43 To show that a defendant's flight constituted resisting arrest
without violence, the State must prove that (1) the officer had an articul-
able well-founded suspicion of criminal activity and (2) the defendant
fled with knowledge that the officer intended to detain him." Mere eye
contact with the officer was not knowledge that the officer intended to
detain him,45 and flight alone, even in a high-crime area, was not a basis
for an arrest for having resisted arrest under section 843.02.
A. Fourth Amendment Progeny: Terry v. Ohio
and Illinois v. Wardlow
C.E.L. II can only be understood through an examination of deci-
sions relating back to Terry v. Ohio. In 1968, the Supreme Court
announced that officers have the right, despite the Fourth Amendment's
bar against unreasonable searches and seizures, to stop and frisk individ-
uals based on "specific reasonable inferences he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience."46 The Court later determined that
flight from the officer was a legitimate factor to infer criminal activity,
and under Florida law this would be the basis for both the investigatory
stop and the probable cause supporting the arrest.
1. TERRY V. OHIO
The Supreme Court decision of Terry v. Ohio involved the arrest of
two men, Terry and Chilton, at 2:30 P.M. by Detective McFadden.
Detective McFadden observed the men exhibiting what McFadden
inferred was suspicious behavior. Terry and Chilton were observed
walking back and forth from a street corner to a store roughly a dozen
times, peering into the window, and returning to the corner to confer.
Detective McFadden suspected the men of casing the store for a robbery.
At this point, McFadden approached the suspects, identified himself as a
41. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (citations omitted).
42. C.E.L. v. State (CE.L. 1), 995 So. 2d 558, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008)
(Altenbernd, J., concurring).
43. M.M.H. v. State, 929 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2006).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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police officer, and asked the suspects to identify themselves. When
Terry mumbled something Detective McFadden could not hear, McFad-
den grabbed the defendant, patted down the outside of the defendant's
clothing, felt a pistol in the defendant's pocket, and removed it. Terry
was convicted on charges of carrying a concealed weapon.
Justice Warren, for the majority, considered the nature of the gov-
ernmental interest, which is justified by reasonable, articulable facts that
justify the intrusion." The Court found, based on the facts, that the
officer was justified in investigating further based on a concern for his
own safety and the safety of others, and that a search was necessary to
assure the suspect was not armed.4 8 Accordingly, the gun and evidence
was not suppressed. The concept of the degree of police intrusion was
based on the degree of articulable suspicion of a crime being committed.
This principle was clear in Terry.
The Court recognized that such a reading of the Fourth Amendment
could spiral into abuse, and so they included a caveat:
Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsi-
bility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harass-
ing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective
evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When such
conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its
fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.49
Unfortunately, decades later, the U.S. Supreme Court would forget this
warning.
47. Id. at 20-21. The holding specifically states:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing with may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
48. The court notes that the reasonableness of the initial search also hinged on the search
being limited to the surface of the clothing, not underneath the clothing. The court stated, "The
sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and
others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover [weapons]." Id.; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 901.151(5) (2011) (under the Florida Stop and
Frisk Law, an officer must have probable cause to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous).
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
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2. ILLINOIs V. WARDLOW
Chief U.S. Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist issued a controversial
opinion in 2001 that broadened the circumstances justifying the Terry
stop. One criminal law professor characterized the opinion as a "troub-
ling indication of the court's obliviousness to what's really going on in
the country."50 The issue in Wardlow was whether the initial stop of
Sam Wardlow was supported by reasonable suspicion required for a
lawful investigatory stop.51 The officers who pursued Wardlow were in
the last car in a four-car caravan driving through an "area known for
heavy narcotics trafficking."5 2 Upon seeing the procession of police
vehicles, Wardlow fled from the area, only later to be cornered by
Officers Nolan53 and Harvey. Officer Nolan "immediately conducted a
protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was
common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics trans-
actions." 54 In a bag Wardlow was carrying, Officer Nolan discovered a
.38-caliber handgun and Wardlow was arrested for its possession."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, rejects the per se rule
supported by Illinois that flight, no matter where, when, or what the
circumstances, always amounts to reasonable suspicion for an investiga-
tory stop, but also held that the character of the neighborhood is relevant
to a reasonableness analysis of a stop.56 Bearing in mind Terry, which
involved innocent conduct that amounted to be suspicious, Rehnquist
allows unprovoked flight to be considered as "a pertinent factor in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion."5 In the very next sentence, Rehnquist
seems to bolster this proposition, stating that "[h]eadlong flight-wher-
ever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."" Thus,
the basis for an investigatory seizure by police could be based solely on
50. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search by Police, High
Court Rules, N.Y. TUmEs, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al (quoting Professor Barry Friedman, New York
University Law School).
51. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
52. Id. at 121.
53. No relation to the author.
54. Id. at 121-22. It is important to note here that the Florida Stop and Frisk Law does not
allow routine patdown searches for generalized concerns for officer safety, or based on the notion
that narcotics and firearms go hand in hand. Officers must have a particularized concern that a
suspect is presently armed and dangerous. See D.L.J. v. State, 932 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 2006); Estevez v. State, 915 So. 2d 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2005); L.D.P. v.
State, 551 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987); Harris v. State, 574 So. 2d 243 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991); Winters v. State, 578 So. 2d 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
55. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
56. Id. at 124.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
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location (high-crime area) and unprovoked flight of the subject."
Justice Stevens and three other justices recognized the extensive
broadening of police authority handed over to the States.6 o Justice Ste-
vens concurred in part, commending the Court for rejecting the Illinois
government's argument that a bright-line rule was necessary, one that
would authorize investigatory stops of anyone who flees at the sight of
police.6 1
Justice Stevens, however, dissented because he recognized the
Terry-stop had officially transformed-from contemplating the tempo-
rary detainment of a possibly "armed and dangerous individuals" based
on specific suspicion6 2- to taking police action because of behavior
"suggestive" 63 of wrongdoing or criminal activity.' Justice Stevens dis-
cusses the broadening of the Terry stop and offers numerous explana-
tions of possible, rational, and perfectly innocent motivations behind
flight from police.6 5 When Justice Stevens enumerates the possibilities
that motivate law-abiding citizens to flee from police, the ever-rational-
totality-of-the-circumstances petition by the majority is increasingly
called into doubt.
The victimization of poor and ethnic minorities is of particular con-
cern to Justice Stevens, and later to the Florida Supreme Court bench.
Justice Stevens states:
. . . [A] reasonable person may conclude that an officer's sudden
appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is
criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger-either
from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and
the police.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id.
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
63. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (headlong flight "is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
but it is certainly suggestive of such" and thus a pertinent factor in a Terry analysis) (emphasis
added).
64. In other words, fleeing from the police after a command to stop.
65. These include fleeing the scene for fear of being wrongfully apprehended as the guilty
party and unwillingness to appear as a witness. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 131 (quoting Alberty v.
United States, 162 U.S. 599, 511 (1896)). Also, Justice Stevens muses:
A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons-to catch up with a friend
a block or two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop
before the bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a
pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of
nature-any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. A
pedestrian might also run because he or she has just sighted one or more police
officers.
Id. at 128-29. Other innocent justifications according to Justice Stevens include fear that the
officer's presence indicates nearby criminal activity wishing to avoid any violence. Id. at 131.
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. .. Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing
in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person
is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that
contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any crimi-
nal activity associated with the officer's sudden presence. 6
This final sentence sums up the recognition that the bar by which we
judge the unreasonableness of seizures has shifted in favor of the State
in a remarkable way.
3. WARDLOW's EFFECT ON FLORIDA CASE LAW
Wardlow had an immediate effect on every area of Florida criminal
law, not just the crime of resisting arrest without violence. Take for
instance two cases dealing with a separate area of search and seizure
law, that of confidential informants. These cases also involve the issue
of reliable and valid inferences by the police based on suspect or inform-
ant behavior. The court appears to assume that police officers are some-
how able to infer with accuracy guilty behavior from innocent behavior.
Research, however, suggests that this assumption is probably not true.67
The lawfulness of these stops, like those involving flight and resisting
arrest without violence, have crucial consequences on motions to sup-
press in the Florida criminal justice system.
The veracity of confidential informants can be established by either
the informant's prior record of reliability or the wealth of detailed, veri-
fiable information given on the occasion in question.6 8 In Lester v. State,
an officer received a tip from an informant that two persons, one was
older, one was younger, and one was wearing black and red shorts, were
selling cocaine.6 9 The court held that the officer was not justified in
making an investigatory stop of two persons who both met the descrip-
tion he had been given and fled at the sight of his presence. 70 The pre-
Wardlow court held this was insufficient for a stop because the descrip-
tion was in general terms, insufficient to pinpoint any one person, and
the officer did not observe the defendant doing anything except fleeing
from him and his police dog.7' Even assuming the informant was relia-
66. Id. at 131-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
67. See Jennifer Skeem et al., Psychological Science in the Courtroom: Consensus and
Controversy 125-29 (2009).
68. Lester v. State, 584 So. 2d 652, 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The presence of police dogs offer yet another innocent reason for flight. See supra note
65. Dog is not always man's best friend. See Letter from Steven H. Rosenbaum, Chief, Special
Litigation Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Alejandro Vilarello, City
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ble, the information relayed coupled with the defendant's flight from the
police, was not predictive or detailed enough to exhibit sufficient indicia
of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion for a legal investigatory
stop.72
Mitchell v. State, decided after Wardlow, exemplifies Wardlow's
effect on Florida criminal law. In Mitchell, the description given by the
confidential informant lacked detail and was consistent with innocent
conduct, much like in Lester. The informant described only the clothing
of two suspects and their location and additionally believed that they
were selling narcotics. The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that
the totality of the circumstances, which involved a high-crime area
according to police involving recent drugs sales, a known confidential
informant, the verification of information provided by that confidential
informant, and the suspect's abbreviated attempt at flight, all supported
the officer's investigatory detention of the defendant. 74 A motion to sup-
press would then solely turn on this question of whether the area in the
arrest form was a "high-crime" area, typically a low-income, minority
area.7 ' The effect of Wardlow was to transform what was once an inno-
cent detail (clothing and location of suspects in a high-crime area) of
corroborating investigation, into to something that automatically equips
officers with reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop.
C.E.L. II would later supply officers with yet another tool, transforming
that once innocent detail into full-blown probable cause to arrest.
B. Florida Case Law Post-Wardlow, Leading up to C.E.L. II
The Florida courts spent nearly a decade grappling with the conse-
quence Wardlow would have on section 843.02. The choice was
between strictly construing Wardlow to criminalize running from the
police, or finding a legislative intent that flight from police should
remain the citizen's right under Florida law. Unfortunately, the Florida
Attorney, Miami City Attorney's Office (Mar. 13, 2003) (available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/miamipd_techletter.pdf) ("Based on our discussions with canine unit
command staff, supervisors, and officers it appears that the [Miami Police Department] actually
uses a 'find and bite' policy because the dog is trained, when off leash, to bite when it encounters
a subject, regardless of whether the subject is actively resisting or attempting to flee.") (Emphasis
added).
72. Id.; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327-30 (1990) (discussing that the quality
and quantity of information along with subsequent corroboration must be taken into account when
determining whether the reliability of information will amount to reasonable suspicion).
73. 787 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2001).
74. Id. at 229.
75. See C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. 1), 995 So. 2d 558, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008)
(Altenbernd, J., concurring) (stressing the racial and socio-economic effects of the "high-crime
neighborhood" factor on civil rights).
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legislature remained silent on the issue, leaving the courts, unguided, to
sort things out. The Third District Court of Appeal chose not to
criminalize flight in high-crime areas in both D.T.B. v. State7 6 and
J.D.H. v. State." The lower court C.E.L v. State decision (C.E.L. I)
reached the Second District Court of Appeal, where the court resolved
the issue in direct conflict with D.TB. The Florida Supreme Court could
no longer ignore the conflict.
1. D. T.B.
D.T.B., a juvenile, was standing outside his apartment complex one
December afternoon, which was in an area known for drug transac-
tions.7 9 Two patrolling officers approached D.T.B. in a vehicle to
engage in a "voluntary field interview" as they had not witnessed any
suspicious behavior of any kind. Seeing the officers approach, D.T.B.
fled, at which point the officers yelled at him to stop, informing him that
they were police officers. When the officers caught up to him, they
charged him with resisting arrest without violence under section 843.02.
The question, as framed by the court was:
[W]hether the holding in Wardlow, that flight from police in a high
crime area creates reasonable suspicion such that the police can stop
a citizen without violating the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, transforms the flight into the crime of resisting
arrest, sufficient to satisfy the elements of a conviction.8 o
Here, the Third District Court of Appeal refused to criminalize the
act of running from the police. The court recognized that criminalizing
flight would automatically turn a consensual "field interview" into suffi-
cient probable cause supporting an arrest.8 I The court reasoned, "[A]s
there was not going to be an arrest, logically, D.T.B. cannot be charged
with having resisted an arrest."8 2 Though sufficient for a Terry stop, the
court refused to extend the holding of Wardlow to support a conviction
under the resisting arrest statute. The court specifically stated,
"Although D.T.B.'s flight may have given the officers reasonable suspi-
cion to stop D.T.B. under Wardlow, Wardlow did not create an articul-
able well founded suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support an
arrest, and justify the charge of resisting.""
76. D.T.B. v. State, 892 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004).
77. J.D.H. v. State, 967 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).
78. 995 So. 2d at 558.
79. D.T.B., 892 So. 2d at 523.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 524.
82. Id. at 525.
83. Id. at 524.
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2. J.D.H.84
J.D.H. was a subsequent Second District Court of Appeal case
where the court rejected the criminalization of flight. J.D.H. was with a
group of teenagers and young adult men on a closed basketball court
outside his residence, an area known for marijuana sales, at eleven
o'clock at night.8 5 Two officers were spotted approaching, and so the
group quickly dispersed. One officer pursued J.D.H., ordering him to
stop, and eventually caught up with him. He was immediately arrested,
rather than questioned as in an investigatory stop, and the ensuing search
incident to arrest revealed cocaine.86
The court, relying on D. T.B., stated that "an individual is guilty of
resisting or obstructing an officer by flight only if he flees while know-
ing of the officer's intent to detain him and if the officer is justified in
detaining the individual before he flees."" Because of this temporal ele-
ment, the court ruled that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion
that J.D.H. had committed or was about to commit a crime before he
fled, thus his resistance could not create the probable cause necessary to
support an arrest for resisting an officer without violence."8 As a result,
all contraband seized pursuant to the illegal arrest was suppressed as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" and J.D.H.'s withhold of adjudication for
possession of cocaine was overturned. 9
3. C.E.L. P0
Just two years later, the Second District Court of Appeal put the
Third District's logic to the test. The facts of C.E.L. I are familiar: two
officers were patrolling a high-crime area regarding complaints of drug
activity and trespassing. C.E.L., a sixteen-year-old juvenile, was stand-
ing with another teenager outside his apartment complex. 92 C.E.L. fled
at the sight of the police approaching. The Second District, however,
structured the issue drastically different from the Third District in D.T.B.
Judge Canady, for the court in C.E.L. I, asked "whether a person who
knowingly fails to heed a police order to stop is guilty of an offense
under section 843.02 when the order to stop is justified by Illinois v.
84. J.D.H. v. State, 967 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).
85. Id. at 1129-30.
86. Id. at 1130.
87. Id. (citing Yarusso v. State, 942 So. 2d 939, 943 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2006))
(second emphasis added).
88. Id. at 1132.
89. Id.
90. C.E.L. v. State (CE.L. 1), 995 So. 2d 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008).
91. Id. at 558.
92. Id. at 563.
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Wardlow." 93 C.E.L. argued that the officer did not have the legal author-
ity to demand that he stop, relying on D.T.B. and J.D.H., because flight
cannot be the basis for both the investigatory detention and the probable
cause supporting the arrest itself.94
The shaky foundation supporting D.T.B. and J.D.H. finally crum-
bled. The court stated that "the evidence against C.E.L. was sufficient
because the police command to stop was issued in the lawful perform-
ance of a legal duty and C.E.L.'s knowing defiance to the command was
an act of resisting, obstructing, or opposing an officer."95 This is the
unfortunate truth; the plain language of the statute, Terry v. Ohio, and its
progeny, can logically lead to no other conclusion. Under the statute,
knowingly disobeying a lawful police order to stop is a crime.96 A law-
ful police order to stop may be based on flight from a high-crime area.97
The court essentially refused to uphold the policy-minded exception that
had been carved out in D.T.B.
In a brief, yet powerful, concurrence, Judge Altenbernd advanced
the frightening tensions inherent in the court's holding. "Although I can-
not refute the logic of our decision today," he begins, "experience sug-
gests to me that the United States Supreme Court did not envision the
circumstances of this case when it decided Illinois v. Wardlow."9" He
recognizes many of the problems that Justice Stevens foresaw, but
brings up issues specific to section 843.02 and high-crime, minority
communities in Florida.
Important considerations to Judge Altenbernd are the particular
facts involved in the case. He mentions that C.E.L. is only sixteen years
old, and that he was only about a mile from his home when he was
arrested.99 "In other words," he says, "[C.E.L.] was in a 'high-crime
neighborhood' because it is his home."" Judge Altenbernd finds it
regrettable that individuals living in these neighborhoods are subject to
lower Fourth Amendment rights than citizens living in more well-to-do
neighborhoods, and worries that police tactics will aim at arresting teens
almost at will for fleeing when they approach."o1 Explicitly bringing up
the legal-political dichotomy that pulls judges in different directions, he
states:
93. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (2011).
97. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000).
98. C.E.L. 1, 995 So. 2d at 563 (Altenbemd, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 564.
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From a legal perspective, it may be of no consequence that the officer
had no basis to detain these teenagers until they ran, but I fear there
are consequences for our communities if we allow the sale of drugs in
poor and ethnic minority neighborhoods into 'high-crime neighbor-
hoods' where the Bill of Rights means something less than what the
original framers intended it to mean for all free people.102
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Florida Supreme Court's Resolution in C.E.L. II
Based on the conflict between C.E.L. I and D.T.B., the Florida
Supreme Court was essentially presented the question as to whether or
not section 843.02 should criminalize flight by people who live in these
impoverished, crime-ridden areas.103 The court specifically considered
whether there should be a rule that reasonable suspicion exist before the
individual flees.' 0 4 C.E.L. I is affirmed, but the court does emphasize
that flight alone is not a criminal offense, but rather, "an individual who
flees must know of the officer's intent to detain him, and the officer must
be justified in making the stop at the point when the command to stop is
issued."o' It seems that the court is searching for a limitation on the
holding that flight in subjectively determined high-crime areas is a
crime. But in consideration of an allegiance to stare decisis and the plain
meaning rule of statutory construction, the court can only take this limi-
tation so far. It may be that flight is an improper vehicle for charging an
individual with obstruction, 106 but this determination is for the political
branches and not for the courts.1 o
Indeed, the court is expressly constrained by the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in the Florida state con-
stitution. The Florida constitutional amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon
probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the
place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things
to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of
evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity
102. Id.
103. See C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. II), 24 So. 3d 1181, 1181 (Fla. 2009).
104. See id. at 1184.
105. Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
106. See D.T.B. v. State, 892 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004).
107. See infra Part IV; see generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139 (2002) (discussing the relationship between the judicial and
political branches).
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with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information
obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence
if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to
the United States Constitution.'os
Commentary to the amendment indicates that the language was added as
a result of Florida courts holding that the Florida constitution affords
citizens greater protection from police intrusion.109
Some argue that when the Fourth Amendment doesn't provide a
remedy, the Equal Protection Clause can fill the gap. Judge Altenbernd
made the point that in high-crime, low-income neighborhoods, "the Bill
of Rights means something less than what the original framers intended
it to mean for all free people.""o Additionally, "[t]here are no signs
telling these teenagers that the neighborhood is a region with reduced
Fourth Amendment rights."' Judge Alternbernd raises important
points, highlighting how section 843.02 can lead to discriminatory
enforcement. 1 2 Here, the state of Florida arguably has a statute that
criminalizes flight in some areas and not others. In other words, there are
areas in Florida with reduced constitutional rights. This arguably justi-
fies exclusion of evidence gathered as a result of the discriminatory
practices of law enforcement.' 13
B. Remaining Defenses after C.E.L. II
Justice Pariente, following in the footsteps of Justice Stevens and
Judge Altenbernd, wrote separately to address her concern for future
cases and the adverse impact of the court's holding on disenfranchised
communities in Florida. Not only does she address the public policy
concerns involved, but also she highlights arguments that remain at the
disposal of attorneys after C.E.L. II.
108. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
109. WLLIAM A. BuzzErr & DEBORAH. K KEARNEY, 1982 AMENDMENT, 1982 HOUSE J. RES.
31-H (explaining that the Amendment addresses the Florida judiciary's refusal in the late 1970's
and early 1980's to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
110. C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L 1), 995 So. 2d 558, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008)
(Altenbemd, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that the proper "constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.") But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal
Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 53, 56 (2003) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
"may well require the use of non-uniform law enforcement techniques in order to provide
effectively equal protection from the threat of crime").
113. See Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an
Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 Am. CruI. L. REv. 1107 (2000).
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First, Justice Pariente stresses that there is no per se rule that rea-
sonable suspicion exists at the time the officer commands a suspect to
stop." 4 "[O]ther factors, when present, could affect whether a person's
flight in a high-crime area provides reasonable suspicion to justify a
Terry stop.""' Justice Pariente urges attorneys to use other factors from
Justice Stevens' concurrence to suggest that flight in a high-crime area
alone did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, on the basis that
Chief Justice Rehnquist uses a totality-of-the-circumstances rationale in
Wardlow.'1 6 Attorneys should argue that other factors were present to
make the suspicion unreasonable, such as "time of day, the number of
people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer
was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed
of the flight, and whether the person's behavior was otherwise unu-
sual."III Attorneys could use these factors to explain the circumstances
surrounding the individual's flight."'
Second, there is the argument that the defendant's flight was
neither "unprovoked" nor "headlong."l 9 As Justice Stevens wondered
himself what exactly "unprovoked" flight is,' 2 0 Justice Pariente instructs
the reader that this lack of clear guidance is an opportunity for
defenses.' 2 ' This argument could be utilized post-C.E.L. II for obstruc-
tion cases arising out of flight in a car from officers approaching, as a
previous exception used was that "flight" in a car is not indicative of
"nervous, evasive behavior," or intent to engage in "headlong flight" in
order to elude an officer. 122 This argument seems most useful if there
were credible witnesses around to observe the behavior and demeanor of
the actors (i.e., defendant and law enforcement). A court may imply the
individual was provoked, based on, for example, a show of force by the
officer,123 the presence of a police dog,124 or the appearance and
114. See C.E.L. v. State (CE.L. II), 24 So. 2d 1181, 1192 (Fla. 2009) (Pariente, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1193.
116. See id. at 1193 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129-30 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., supra note 65.
119. See C.E.L. II, 24 So. 3d at 1193.
120. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 141 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Nowhere in Illinois' briefs does it specify what it means by 'unprovoked."').
121. See CE.L. , 24 So. 3d at 1193.
122. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 973 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2008) (holding that
the defendant's act of driving away from foot patrol officers in an area known for drug deals did
not raise reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop but is merely the "motor vehicle equivalent of a
person who simply walks away from an officer on foot"); Paff v. State, 884 So. 2d 271 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004) (holding that a car parked in a high-crime area which exited quickly upon
seeing officer and no traffic violation was observed was an illegal stop).
123. E.g., brandishing a weapon, running toward the individual.
124. See supra note 71.
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demeanor of the officer.
Lastly, there is the question as to whether the police order to stop
occurred in a high-crime area.125 The State has the burden of establish-
ing that the area in question is a high-crime area. 126 The officer must
provide specific details regarding the number of arrests in the neighbor-
hood and testify as to the character of the neighborhood. 127
These arguments legally fit squarely within Wardlow, the plain lan-
guage of the statute, and C.E.L. II, but allow room for the courts to have
a role in limiting the number of convictions for resisting or obstructing
an officer in the execution of a legal duty. At the time of Justice
Pariente's writing, the question seemed open as to whether Wardlow and
C.E.L. II will breed "unintended results" by "criminalizing otherwise
innocent conduct." 128
C. Post-C.E.L. II Cases
O.B. v. Statel29 and Hunter v. State' indicate a reluctance to
extend the Florida Supreme Court's holding in C.E.L. II. Both cases
interpret section 843.02 and conclude that there is no reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity because the flight occurs in a location not
legally established to be a "high-crime" area.
The Eleventh Circuit also displays this same reluctance. In Jessup
v. Miami-Dade County,"3 ' a civil case, the court found sufficient evi-
dence that the officers were no longer engaged in a lawful Terry stop at
the time Jessup was arrested. "Even if we assume that the officers ini-
tially had reasonable suspicion to stop Jessup . . . [once] there was no
further basis for suspecting any criminal activity and, thus, no lawful
reason to continue any detention[,] . . . any Terry stop should have
ceased at that point."1 32 This opinion illustrates the very important point
that a suspect may flee from police in a high-crime area, giving reasona-
ble suspicion for a Terry stop, but-if he or she stops and talks to police
and reasonable suspicion is mitigated during that stop-the fleeing sus-
pect must be free to leave. 33
One federal case, on the other hand, shows that the court is willing
to forego the high-crime area requirement thus apparently broadening
125. See C.E.L. II, 24 So. 3d at 1194 (Pariente, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 1195.
127. See id. (discussing D.R. v. State, 941 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2006)).
128. Id. at 1196 (Pariente, J., concurring).
129. 36 So. 3d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2010).
130. 32 So. 3d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2010).
131. No. 10-11519, 2011 WL 3861690, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished opinion).
132. Id.
133. But see supra Part I.
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Wardlow's holding."' In Williams v. State, the government did not offer
any evidence whatsoever as to whether or not Williams was arrested in a
high-crime area. The court concluded that the lack of testimony regard-
ing high-crime area was "amply overcome by the anonymous tip, the
description, the concealment, and the second flight [of the
defendant]."135
The practical result of C.E.L. II essentially adopts the same bright-
line rule opposed by both the majority and dissent in Wardlow. Illinois
pushed for a per se rule authorizing detention of anyone who flees at the
mere sight of a police officer.' 36 The Fourth Amendment doctrine, in
combination with section 843.02, has essentially the same effect-if the
individual flees in one of these neighborhoods, the police may arrest. All
the officer has to do in order to detain the individual is go through the
formality of ordering the individual to stop.13 7
IV. CONCLUSION
The solution to the issues presented by C.E.L. II must come from
the legislative and executive branches. The courts, as discussed above,
can have but a very restricted and imperfect role in limiting the case's
impact. The C.E.L. II court's hands were tied, so to speak. "Through
their 1982 amendment of Article I, Section 12 of our state constitution,
the citizens of Florida have delegated their authority for defining the
contours of their right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures to the United States Supreme Court."138 The state legislature, on
the other hand, is free to impose higher search and seizure standards
than the Fourth Amendment.'39
134. Williams v. State, Nos. 3DO9-1434, 3DO9-2043, 2010 WL 5373155, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
29, 2010) (applying Florida criminal law).
135. Id. at *2.
136. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 118, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.)
137. Whether or not that individual heard the officer seems to have no bearing on the
lawfulness of the stop. Thus it is not legally relevant whether the individual does not understand
the order to stop because the individual does not understand English. This is of particular
consequence for non-immigrant tourists and immigrants with lawful status. Basic knowledge of
the English language is only a requirement of administrative naturalization, but not for lawful
permanent residency or other visas. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 312; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1423 (2006); see also supra note 9.
138. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
139. State v. Langsford, 816 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2002) (stating that
the state constitution "'shall be construed' as the Fourth Amendment is interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court . . . does not prohibit the legislature from passing statutes which give
Florida citizens greater protections than the Fourth Amendment").
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A. Legislative Recommendations
The Florida legislature should amend section 843.02. A recent pro-
posal by Representative Perry E. Thurston was introduced on March 8,
2011 but quickly died on May 7, 2011 in the Criminal Justice Subcom-
mittee.14 0 Representative Thurston added the following language to the
end of section 843.02 in his proposed bill: "For such purposes of this
section, resistance, obstruction, or opposition must be based on factors
other than mere flight from an officer or other person to whom this
section applies." 4 1
This language, practically speaking, does nothing to assuage the
concerns of Justice Stevens, Judge Alterbernd, and Justice Pariente.
C.E.L. II did not hold that flight, standing alone, constituted resisting
arrest without violence under section 843.02. C.E.L. II criminalized the
act of "continued flight."142 The Florida Supreme Court specifically
stated flight alone is not a criminal offense, but rather, "an individual
who flees must know of the officer's intent to detain him, and the officer
must be justified in making the stop at the point when the command to
stop is issued."1 43
To have a real impact on police-citizen relations, the legislature
must impose a higher standard of suspicion on law enforcement officers
patrolling high-crime areas. Mimicking the warrantless arrest statute,14
the legislature could add this additional language:
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person under this section
when:
(1) probable cause for some other crime exists; or
(2) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an emer-
gency exists that presents an imminent and serious threat to life or
property.
This approach is similar to the "community caretaking" model used dur-
ing storms and post-natural disasters.'45 Because police have broad
authority under their community caretaking functions, a central condi-
tion for a lawful arrest is that the officer must have reasonable grounds
to believe that an emergency exists that presents an "imminent and seri-
140. HB 203 - Resisting an Officer or Other Specified Person Without Violence, FLORIDA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?Bill
Id=45070 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
141. H.B. 203, Fla. 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (emphasis added).
142. C.E.L. v. State (C.E.L. If), 24 So. 3d 1181, 1181 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied,
130 S.Ct. 3290 (2010).
143. Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
144. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (2011).
145. See generally Michael R. Domino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking,
Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1485
(2009) (discussing the reasonableness of caretaking searches).
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ous threat to life or property."l4 6 This policy would return to the basis of
Terry and Wardlow, where the basis for the stop and frisk was both
investigatory and protective, only leading to arrest after discovery of
dangerous firearms.1 7
This additional requirement also takes into account the concerns of
the Third District Court of Appeal in D.T.B. Flight in high-crime areas
should give officers suspicion to stop individuals, but Wardlow did not
mean to create a sufficient basis to both support an investigatory stop
and an arrest for a charge of resisting. 14 8
B. Executive Recommendations
A more immediate approach could come from within local police
departments. To improve police-citizen relations, Florida police depart-
ments should implement internal standards to view high-crime areas as
"crisis" areas were police accomplish such "community caretaking"
functions. These high-crime areas in cities have boundaries and do pre-
sent to police departments a wide range of special problems consistent
with community caretaking during natural disasters and emergencies.
Police could thus engage in consensual encounters with youth and others
in high-crime areas without it being a crime, even if the youth ran away.
The police could obtain brief in service training in crisis intervention
techniques and debriefing and what has been referred to as "defus-
ing."' 49 These kinds of solutions would result in better community rela-
tions without abandoning the mandate to uphold the law and keep the
community safe.
The obstruction statute encompasses a myriad of scenarios, ranging
from fleeing and eluding during a traffic stop, hit and runs, and so on.
But in a so-called consensual encounter, the individual should remain
free to leave.'5 0 Presence in the high-crime area you call home should
not reduce or alter this constitutional right. The Florida legislature and
146. See generally Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Memorandum by Kurt N.
Schwartz, Assistant Attorney Gen., Mass., Police Powers During Public Emergencies: Police
Authority to Act Without a Warrant or Court Order Under the Community Caretaking Doctrine,
(Dec. 9, 2003) (http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/cdc/reportingliq-community-caretaking-
function.pdf).
147. The basis for both searches was protective and both searches revealed firearms. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000).
148. D.T.B. v. State, 892 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
149. See Gilbert Reyes & Jon D. Elhai, Psychosocial Interventions in the Early Phases of
Disasters, 41 PSYCHOTHERAPY THEORY REs. & PRAc. 399 (2004).
150. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) ("During a consensual encounter a
citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or choose to ignore them.").
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community leaders should take immediate action to prevent the unin-
tended and unforeseen consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court's
broadening of the Terry stop in Wardlow.
